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Governments have historically intervened
extensively in the banking sector to promote
ﬁnancial stability. Often, their intervention pol-
icies have blocked some natural mechanisms
and have resulted in undesired outcomes. One
of those policies, government-sponsored depos-
it insurance, aims to maintain ﬁnancial stability
by minimizing the likelihood of bank runs.
However, recent empirical evidence showed
that explicit government guarantees reduced
the market participation of depositors and ad-
versely aﬀected bank stability (Barth, Caprio,
& Levine, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragi-
ache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004).
In this paper, we present contrary empirical
evidence of declining market participation un-
der explicit government guarantee to deposi-
tors. In volatile political and macroeconomic
environments with insuﬃcient regulations and
poor supervision, the governments may lose
their credibility. It can be argued that this loss
of conﬁdence in government motivates bank
stakeholders 1 to be more involved in disciplin-
ing risky banks, even under full insurance. To-
ward this end, we analyzed the behavior of the141market and the banks in Turkey for the period
during 1988–2000. Turkey’s explicit deposit
insurance was established in 1983 and ex-
panded to full coverage after the economic cri-
sis in 1994. After eleven years of an explicit
limited-coverage scheme, the transition from
implicit blanket guarantee back to limited cov-
erage took another seven years. Rapid political
turnover and the involvement of the business
and public communities in the distorted bank-
ing system of Turkey added to the corruption
and signiﬁcantly impaired the credibility of
the incumbent governments (Chhibber, 2004).
This environment might encourage stakehold-
ers to react strongly to excessive risk-taking
by banks. To our knowledge, previous empiri-
cal studies in the literature have not examined
the long sub-periods that might erode the cred-
ibility of the insurance system.5
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stakeholders—depositors and borrowers—to-
ward the risky behavior of banks before and
after a period of extensive government guaran-
tee. The reaction of small savers or depositors
against bank risk-taking has been studied
extensively, but there has been a paucity of re-
search on the interests of borrowers at risk.
Kim, Kliger, and Vale (2003) demonstrated
empirically that signiﬁcant switching costs in
the banking sector increased the inclination of
borrowers to choose banks that were able to ex-
tend the line of credit or provide new loans on
demand. Following this argument, we investi-
gate the possibility that borrowers would lessen
their relationship with risky banks in order to
avoid possible switching costs incurred in the
event of bank failures.
Our empirical results showed that bank
depositors and borrowers reacted negatively
to risky banks and punished them even more
during the period of generous government
guarantee, controlling for some bank charac-
teristics, macroeconomic conditions, and yearly
eﬀects. Although depositors and borrowers
lessened their relationship with risky banks,
these banks were found to increase their moral
hazard behavior signiﬁcantly, especially after
the introduction of 100% deposit insurance.
Knowing that Turkey experienced a massive
ﬁnancial crisis in 2001, the results of this study
reinforce previous evidence that market reac-
tion would not prevent the fragility of the
banking system, unless banks manage risk
eﬀectively and the government maintains sound
supervision of banks and a stable macroeco-
nomic environment.
This study contributes to the existing litera-
ture in two respects. First, we study how mar-
ket participants’ reactions changed with the
introduction of generous government guaran-
tee. Second, we examine the disciplining role
of borrowers in addition to the role of deposi-
tors. To the best of our knowledge, there is only
one empirical study that shows the signiﬁcance
of the role played by borrowers in disciplining
banks (Kim, Kristiansen, & Vale, 2005 demon-
strated with Norwegian banks).
This paper is organized as follows. The next
section provides information about the Turkish
banking system and the development of deposit
insurance in Turkey. Section 3 contains a brief
review of the literature on market reaction, the
empirical models, and the data. The estimated
results are reported and interpreted in Section
4. The paper concludes in Section 5.2. BACKGROUND
(a) The banking sector in Turkey
The banking sector constitutes a large part of
the Turkish ﬁnancial system. Denizer, Gultekin
and Gultekin (2000) stated that the ﬁnancial
system and the banking system are synonymous
in Turkey. Banks have dominated every aspect
of ﬁnancial activity and have been responsible
for the expansion of the ﬁnancial system in
the country. However, the size of the banking
sector is relatively small, compared to other
upper-middle-income countries. For example,
the ratio of bank deposits to the nominal
GDP was 37.70% in Turkey in 2000, whereas
the average of this ratio for the upper-middle-
income countries was 43.50%. Moreover, the
private credits provided by deposit money
banks and other ﬁnancial institutions consti-
tuted, on average, 43.9% of the GDP in these
countries, but it was only 18.77% of the GDP
in Turkey in 2000. 2
The deregulation of banking and other
ﬁnancial services started in 1980 in order to
develop a competitive and eﬃcient ﬁnancial
system. The initial reforms eliminated interest
rate restrictions on deposits and loans, facili-
tated the entry of new banks into the system,
and introduced new ﬁnancial instruments and
institutions. As a result, there was an increase
in the number of banks. For example, the
number of banks was 37 in 1980, 64 in 1990,
and 81 in 2000. These reforms resulted in
ﬁerce competition in the banking sector and
high interest rates. Furthermore, the emer-
gence of money brokers called ‘‘bankers’’
caused interest rates on savings to increase sig-
niﬁcantly via Ponzi ﬁnancing methods (see, for
example, Akyuz & Boratav, 2003). However,
the ﬁnancial distress in the real sector and un-
healthy competition in banking resulted in the
failure of six banks in total during 1983–84.
These collapses caused the Central Bank to
regulate the interest rates on deposits and to
introduce the deposit insurance system in or-
der to prevent potential bank runs. The Cen-
tral Bank continued to regulate deposit rates
until 1988 for the sake of maintaining positive
rates of return (Denizer, 1997). Even though
banks behaved competitively 3 in terms of
determining price for deposits and bank loans
throughout the period of analysis (1988–2000),
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms in the
Turkish banking sector have arguably been
lagging behind the deregulation of the ﬁnan-
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2006).
On the other hand, the corporations have not
changed their ﬁnancial behavior according to
the reforms (Akyuz, 1990). The government
has kept its control over the economy. As a re-
sult, the weak and fragile Turkish economy
experienced three serious crises in 1994, 1998–
99, and 2000–01. The economy collapsed after
these crises and was partially stabilized only
after IMF intervention and the accompanying
rescue packages (Demir, 2004). As a result of
these crises, three banks were closed in 1994,
and 17 banks failed in the four year period dur-
ing 1998–2001.
The crisis in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s illus-
trated the importance of the regulation of the
banking system. A new bank act was enacted
in 1985 in order to improve the structural
weaknesses of the Turkish banking system.
This act gave the responsibility to both the
Treasury and the Central Bank for the regula-
tion and supervision of banks. The sworn bank
auditors associated with the Treasury were
authorized to examine the legal compliance
and ﬁnancial standing of banks, whereas the
Central Bank was responsible for oﬀ-site super-
vision, because banks are periodically required
to provide their ﬁnancial statements to the Cen-
tral Bank.
Although rules and regulations for the needs
of a liberalized banking system had been con-
structed in the second half of the 1980s, it is
widely acknowledged that the oﬃcial authori-
ties in Turkey behaved less proactively in
regulating banks during the 1990s than had
been the case. Ersel (1999) emphasized that
the work of the banking sector was plagued
by the political authorities: ‘‘The political
authority, instead of allocating funds from
the budget, chose to rely on these banks’ re-
sources. The central government either accu-
mulated huge amounts of debts owed to
state-owned banks or paid its debts with not
so-liquid government debt instruments. This
practice created insurmountable problems for
the state-owned banks. In order to reduce
the burden inﬂicted by the government on
state-owned banks, these banks were treated
as if they were subject, de facto, to softer reg-
ulatory constraints. This discrimination in fa-
vor of state-owned banks led to distortions
in the ﬁnancial markets. Private banks (rightly,
from their points of view) complained about
‘‘unfair competition’’ stemming from state-
owned banks. This environment, obviously,was not conductive for the Undersecretariat
of the Treasury to carry out its supervision
function as desired.’’ The principal objective
of the Treasury was to solve the cash budget
problem of the government. Hence, ineﬀective
implementation of these rules created a moral
hazard and a more vulnerable banking system.
It also compelled the authorities to introduce a
new set of regulations in 1999 with a new bank
act. This act established an independent
Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency
(BRSA) to supervise and regulate the Turkish
banking sector. The formation of this agency
was highlighted in a letter of intent signed by
the IMF, which required the strengthening
and regulation of the banking sector in
Turkey. This new agency took over these
functions from the Treasury in September
2000.
Cizre and Yeldan (2005) pointed out that in
Turkey, the ﬁrst-generation reform phase did
not go far enough, because of the involvement
of economic bureaucrats and politicians and of
their supporters in economic interest groups
on banking sector activities. Similarly, Alper
and Onis (2002) argued that ‘‘. . .the authori-
ties made limited or no attempt to deal with
the pervasive problem of connected lending
associated with strong organic links character-
izing the relationship between the banks and
holding companies. It is recognized that ceil-
ings on connected bank lending are not restric-
tive enough by international standards and
even these levels tend to have been weakly en-
forced. Not surprisingly, the problem of non-
performing loans has emerged as an endemic
problem in the Turkish context.’’ In addition
to the weak implementation of the regulations,
for various reasons (including political inter-
ventions until 1999), the IMF’s new structural
reform program ignored the fragility of the
ﬁnancial markets and institutions and caused
further loss of conﬁdence in the banking sec-
tor. In particular, due to the IMF’s design fail-
ure, the Central Bank’s ability to implement
implicit mechanisms such as ‘‘lender of last re-
sort’’ in addition to the ﬁscal authorities’ use
of their traditional tools of austerity made
the economy powerless against speculative at-
tacks (see Akyuz & Boratav, 2003; Alper &
Onis, 2002; Cizre & Yeldan, 2005). Consider-
ing all, in this paper, we argue that in quite
a lax regulatory environment, the market—
depositors and borrowers—might have an
incentive to protect their stakes from various
risks in the banking system.
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The Turkish Deposit Insurance Fund was
established in 1983. Since its establishment,
the coverage of deposit insurance has changed
many times. Initially, the maximum coverage
was 3 million Turkish Lira (TL) (or $29,000)
worth of deposit belonging to one person in
one bank. In 1986, the insurance was limited
to initial deposits excluding the earned interest
in domestic branches of all banks operating in
Turkey. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, high
inﬂation and depreciation of the TL accelerated
the expansion of foreign currency (FX) denom-
inated deposits. 4 As a result, FX deposits were
also taken under partial government guarantee
in 1992, but deposits in oﬀ-shore branches were
excluded. Although the coverage was increased
to 75 million TL ($9,000), only two-thirds of
this amount (50 million TL) was fully insured;
the remaining (25 million TL) was only 60% in-
sured.
The failure of three private banks in 1994,
growing uncertainty in the economy, and the
resulting economic crisis in 1994 increased the
expectations of bank runs in Turkey. These
developments led to the establishment of full
deposit insurance in 1994 to cover both TL
and FX denominated deposits. With this exten-
sion, all deposit liabilities in the domestic and
oﬀ-shore branches of local and foreign banks
operating in Turkey were placed under full gov-
ernment guarantee. After pursuing explicit de-
posit insurance for seven years, another
economic crisis in 2000 compelled the introduc-
tion of further insurance: the blanket guaran-
tee. Within a short period, by 2001, this
blanket guarantee was removed, and deposit
insurance coverage was limited to 50 billion
TL ($75,000). Although a 100% deposit insur-
ance scheme was conceived of as a temporary
measure to prevent possible bank panic in
1994, due to the lack of political will, it took
a while to remove such an ill-designed safety
net. According to Pazarbasioglu (2002), the
cost of the failure of private banks during
the 2000–01 banking crisis was 11.9% of the
GDP. When the cost of the non-performing
loans of the state banks is included, the cost in-
creases to 19.3% of the GDP. 5
(c) A brief literature review on market discipline
Strengthening market reaction to discipline
banks or to reduce the moral hazard faced by
banks has been a major policy issue for almosttwo decades (Basel Committee on Bank Super-
vision, 2001). The literature on market disci-
pline has evaluated the reaction of depositors
against bank risk-taking by analyzing two mea-
sures: the growth rate of deposits and the inter-
est rate on deposits. There are few studies on
the change in the quantity of bank deposits as
it relates to the apparent default risk of a bank.
For example, Park (1995) and Park and Peris-
tiani (1998) provided signiﬁcant evidence that
riskier US thrifts experienced smaller deposit
growth during the 1980s. On the contrary, there
is ample evidence for the market’s ability to rec-
ognize default risk in bank obligations based on
the second measure of market discipline. Early
works showed that riskier banks usually paid
higher interest rates on large certiﬁcates of
deposits (Baer & Brewer, 1986; Cargill, 1989;
Ellis & Flannery, 1992; Hannan & Hanweck,
1988) and on subordinated notes and deben-
tures (Flannery & Sorescu, 1996; Sironi,
2003). Despite a few studies that found no evi-
dence of the pricing of risk in banking (see
Avery, Belton, & Goldberg, 1988; Gorton &
Santomero, 1990), most of the studies in the
developed economies indicated signiﬁcant reac-
tion to banks’ risk-taking.
The ﬁndings of the studies examining market
discipline in developing countries have been
consistent with those in developed countries.
For example, Barajas and Steiner (2000) found
that in Colombia, banks with strong fundamen-
tals provided lower interest rates to depositors
but still had high deposit growth rates. Calom-
iris and Powell (2001) presented a signiﬁcant
relationship in Argentina between deposit inter-
est rate and deposit growth on the one hand,
and bank fundamentals on the other. Similarly,
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) showed
that depositors punished risky banks by with-
drawing their deposits and by requiring higher
interest rates in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico
during the 1980s and 1990s.3. METHODOLOGY
(a) A model for depositor and borrower discipline
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, the disciplinary
roles of both depositors and borrowers are
modeled using a loanable-funds framework
for two types of contracts issued by banks: de-
posit and loan contracts. Because the character-
istics of these contracts diﬀer, each has its own
demand and supply, in which the interest rates
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mined at the equilibrium.
An increase in the interest rate on deposits
makes depositors willing to supply more funds
to banks, all else being equal. On the other
hand, banks (demanders of the loanable funds)
seek more funds when deposit interest rates are
low. In equilibrium, the quantity of loanable
funds or deposits supplied by the depositors
equals the amount of deposits demanded by
the banks. In this simple framework, if banks
undertake more risk, the depositors will reduce
their supply of loanable funds at all levels of
interest rates on deposits (i.e., the supply curve
of loanable funds shifts to the left), and in equi-
librium, deposit interest rates increase with the
contraction of bank deposits. Thus, when the
depositors observe risk-taking behavior in
banks, they may penalize them by withdrawing
their deposits (thus reducing the supply of loan-
able funds) and/or requiring higher interest
rates. This is the ﬁrst aspect of the market dis-
cipline using deposit contracts.
A similar framework is used to explain the
role of borrowers in disciplining banks. Loan-
able funds are redeﬁned as the funds that
change hands between the bank and the bor-
rowers; the bank is the supplier of these funds,
and the borrowers are the demanders. In equi-
librium, there is a loan rate in which the loan
demand equals the amount of funds supplied
by a bank. When the bank is perceived to be
risky, the demand for its loanable funds will de-
cline at all levels of interest rates (i.e., the de-
mand curve for the bank’s loans will shift to
the left), and in equilibrium, the amount of loan
provided by the risky bank will decrease.
In this context, the following reduced-form
model with time-ﬁxed eﬀects is used to study
the existence of market reaction:
Reactioni;t ¼ f ðPFAILi;t;BANKi;t; YEARtÞ; ð1Þ
where Reactioni,t represents a vector of vari-
ables that are used as proxies for reactions of
depositors and borrowers to bank i in year t.
The growth rate of real deposits (GDEPR)
and the implicit interest rate on deposits
(IDEP) 6 are the traditional measures to evalu-
ate market discipline. The growth rate of real
credits (GCRER) is the other dependent vari-
able that measures the reaction of borrowers.
In theory, because both the demand and supply
of loanable funds decline at the same time that
the riskiness of banks increases, the direction of
the change in the interest rate on credits cannotbe predicted and depends on the amount of
shift in the supply and demand schedules for
loanable funds. Therefore, we did not study
the interest rate on credits as an indicator of
borrower reaction. PFAILi,t represents the risk
of bank i at time t. BANKi,t and YEARt are the
vectors of variables representing bank charac-
teristics and year dummy variables, respec-
tively.
The bank risk is proxied with the predicted
probability of failure of a bank, PFAIL. It is as-
sumed that bank clients are rational and able to
predict the probability of insolvency using pub-
licly available information. PFAILi,t, is esti-
mated by using the following logit model:
FAILi;t ¼ f ðX i;t1;Et1; TRENDtÞ; ð2Þ
where FAILi,t takes a value of 1 if bank i fails in
year t and 0 otherwise. Xi,t1 and Et1 represent
the vectors of variables for bank characteristics
and economic conditions in year t  1 respec-
tively. Two economic variables are included in
the model: the growth rate in industrial produc-
tion (GROWTH-IP) and a crisis dummy (CRI-
SIS) variable. The dummy variable takes a
value of 1 in 1991, 1994, and 2000 7 and 0 in
other years. In Eqn. (2), we use a linear-time
trend variable (TREND) in order to control
for changes in the banking sector over the sam-
ple period that may not be captured by other
control variables.
We examine various bank characteristics,
Xi,t1. These are a capital asset ratio (CARA-
TIO) for assessing the insolvency risk of an
individual bank, the ratio of non-performing
loans to total capital (BADTK) as a proxy
to the quality of loans, a liquid assets to total
deposits ratio (LIQDEP) for liquidity risk, the
share of short-term credits in total assets
(SHCREA) to reﬂect the maturity of loans
and borrowers’ conﬁdence in the bank, a
before-tax return on assets (ROA) and ex-
pense ratio (EXPENSE) to consider the prof-
itability of a bank, and the diﬀerence between
implied interest rates on credits and deposits
(SPREAD) to measure interest rate risk. Sim-
ilar indicators are used by Park and Peristiani
(1998), Barajas and Steiner (2000), and Marti-
nez-Peria and Schmukler (2001). Rojas-Suarez
(2001) found that banks that hold more loans
in their portfolio relative to other banks are
riskier, and that spread is another indicator
of risky banks in developing countries. In cal-
culating the capital–asset ratio, total capital is
deﬁned as a summation of paid-in capital,
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year. Because of high inﬂation in Turkey,
companies are allowed to revalue their ﬁxed
assets. Because of revaluation, the increase in
assets side of the balance sheet is reported as
a revaluation fund in equity, which artiﬁcially
increases total capital. This item is not in-
cluded when calculating the capital of a bank.
The growth rate of credits for bank i over the
mean credit growth rate for the whole bank-
ing sector in year t (GCREi,t) is also included
in the model as a proxy for credit risk. The
size of the bank, SHASSET, measured by
the contribution of each bank to the total as-
sets in the banking sector, is also controlled in
the model. Thus, the probability of failure in
year t is forecasted using the position of the
bank in year t  1.
It is hypothesized that as risk—that is, pre-
dicted probability of failure—changes, all of
the market reaction measures will be unaf-
fected. 8 However, if a market punishes risky
banks, it is expected that the interest rate on
deposits (IDEP) increases but that the growth
rates of real deposits (GDEPR) and real credits
(GCRER) decrease.
Other bank characteristics, BANKi,t, that are
controlled for in the empirical model speciﬁed
in Eqn. (1) are bank size (SIZE), ownership
type (FOREIGN, STATE), 9 the listing status
of the bank on the Istanbul Stock Exchange
(LISTING), the years since the establishment
of a bank (AGE), and the number of bank
branches (BRANCH). The last three variables
can be considered to be proxies for the banks’
visibility. The visible banks are expected to col-
lect more deposits and give more loans.
In order to control for the events during the
years of study, such as crises, and earthquakes,
we included a vector of dummy variables,
YEARt, in the model. Each year, the dummy
variable takes a value of 1 in year t and 0 other-
wise, t = 1989, . . . , 2000.
The model with time-ﬁxed eﬀects does not al-
low us to examine how the market reaction
variables have changed during the full deposit
insurance period. Therefore, the model speci-
ﬁed in Eqn. (1) is modiﬁed by controlling for
economic characteristics, instead of for time-
ﬁxed eﬀects:
Reactioni;t ¼ f ðPFAILi;t;DIt;BANKi;t;EtÞ; ð3Þ
where DIt is a dummy variable that has a
value of 1 for the full insurance period
(1994–2000) and 0 otherwise; and Et representseconomic variables. Economic conditions (Et)
must be controlled in the analysis in order to
eliminate the eﬀects of the state of the
economy on the deposit and credit markets.
Et represents three variables: the growth rate
in real domestic output (CYCLE), the crisis
dummy variable (CRISIS), and the real inter-
est rates on Turkish government bonds (REA-
LINT).
During the analysis period (1988–2000), it
can be argued that the public sector had a di-
rect impact on the banks’ balance sheets. The
interest rate on public debt contracts increased
signiﬁcantly higher than other debt contracts;
private commercial banks have been the main
buyers of public debt instruments. For exam-
ple, the average monthly interest rate was
around 6%, which was compounded to over
100% annually in 1999, when the inﬂation rate
was 68.8%. In order to consider the eﬀects of
the opportunity cost of private loan provi-
sions by banks and the opportunity cost of
investing in banks by depositors, we incorpo-
rate into the model the real interest rates on
Turkish government bonds (REALINT). It is
hypothesized that increasing the interest rate
on government bonds would cause both credit
provisions and deposit demand to decrease.
Hence, the equilibrium growth rate in deposits
and credits would negatively relate to REA-
LINT.
In a recent study, Demirguc-Kunt and Huiz-
inga (2004) examined diﬀerent deposit insur-
ance schemes over 50 countries and found
that explicit deposit insurance lessened but did
not eliminate the market’s reaction to risk-tak-
ing. On the contrary, we argue that political
and economic uncertainties undermine the
credibility of the promises of governments to
depositors, and, hence, market reaction
strengthens signiﬁcantly. To examine how mar-
ket reaction changed during the full deposit
insurance period, the sample period is divided
into two: before full insurance period (1988–
93) and after full insurance period (1994–
2000). The model speciﬁed in Eqn. (1) is esti-
mated for these two sub-periods. We expect
to observe a negative coeﬃcient on the bank
risk variable (PFAIL) in the models—thus
explaining the growth rate of real deposits
(GDEPR) and the growth rate of real bank
credits (GCRER)—and a positive coeﬃcient in
the interest rate on deposits (IDEP) in the
model in the second sub-period. The deﬁnitions
of all of the variables are presented in the
Appendix (Table A1).
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In the second part of the study, we examine
the moral hazard behavior of commercial banks
in Turkey and explore how it changed with the
introduction of full deposit insurance. The mor-
al hazard behavior of banks is measured by four
variables: capital-to-assets ratio (CARATIO) as
a measure of capital adequacy; the ratio of past
due loans to total loans (BADLOANS) as a
measure of delinquency risk or as an asset qual-
ity indicator; the ratio of liquid assets to total
deposits (LIQDEP) as an indication of liquidity
risk; and, ﬁnally, the diﬀerence between implicit
interest rates on credits and deposits (SPREAD)
as a measure of credit and interest rate risk. The
ﬁrst three measures are well-known indicators
of possible bank failure. In the recent empirical
and theoretical studies, it has been found that
the riskiness of a bank is related to the net inter-
est rate margin (SPREAD). For example, Wong
(1997) theoretically showed that the optimal
interest margin was positively associated with
the default and interest rate risks. Likewise,
Angbazo (1997) and Rojas-Suarez (2001) pro-
vided empirical evidence for the positive and
signiﬁcant relationship between the net interest
margin and the credit and interest rate risk of
banks both in the USA and in several develop-
ing economies.
Size, 10 ownership type, listing status, and the
age of the bank are the factors that might aﬀect
the risk-taking behavior of banks and must be
controlled for in analyzing the moral hazard
behavior of banks. In particular, large banks
are expected to take greater risks than other
banks because of ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ protection.
The age variable is used both to capture the im-
pact of the experience of banks and to control
for the quality of loans that have a longer credit
history. Because the ﬁrms listed in the Istanbul
Stock Exchange (ISE) are exposed to more reg-
ulations and are monitored by existing and po-
tential investors, they may be more careful
about taking risk than would be the non-listed
ﬁrms. If the non-listed ﬁrms are tightly held by
only a few owners, they may also be less reluc-
tant to take risk.
The following reduced-form model is esti-
mated to examine the moral hazard behavior
of banks:
Riski;t ¼ f ðDIt;BANKi;t;EtÞ; ð4Þ
where Riski,t represents a vector with variables
CARATIO, BADLOANS, LIQDEP, andSPREAD. The independent variables are the
same as those explained in the market reaction
model (DIt, BANKi,t, and Et).
It is hypothesized that banks take greater
risks during the generous government guaran-
tee period. BADLOANS, LIQDEP, and
SPREAD are expected to be higher in the expli-
cit full deposit insurance period than in the par-
tial insurance period. On the contrary, banks
are expected to have a lower CARATIO in
the full insurance period, if moral hazard in-
creases with generous guarantee. All of these
models speciﬁed in Eqns. (1), (3), and (4) are
estimated using the ordinary least squares, but
standard errors are adjusted because of auto-
correlation and heteroscasticity. 11
(c) Data and sample
The market reaction and moral hazard
behavior of banks in the Turkish banking sys-
tem are analyzed for the sample period during
1988–2000. The beginning of this period is
determined by the electronic availability of
bank data. We ended our sample in 2000, be-
cause in 2001, deposit insurance coverage chan-
ged from full to limited, and the new
supervisory authority, the Banking Regulation
and Supervision Agency, was established to
supervise the banking sector. The data were
obtained from the Yearbooks of the Turkish
Banking Association (TBA). Every year, the
TBA provides the audited ﬁnancial statements
of domestic and foreign banks operating in
Turkey.
Only commercial banks are considered in the
analysis. Table 1 shows the number of banks
included in the sample over time. 12 Twenty-
three banks failed during this period, with the
majority of failures occurring around the crisis
periods, especially in 2001. The number of
banks diﬀered over the sample period because
of the entrance of new banks and the failure
of existing ones. Table A2 in the Appendix lists
all of the banks included in the sample.
Table 2 presents the mean and standard devi-
ation of variables for the whole period and for
the sub-periods before and after the introduc-
tion of full deposit insurance. The equality of
the variables in the two sub-periods is tested
with a t-statistic. Except for the real growth
rate of deposits (GDEPR), none of the mean
values of market reaction variables is found
to change signiﬁcantly after 1994.
The mean values of all risk measures
before and after full deposit insurance were
Table 1. Distribution of banks for the period 1988–2001a
Years 1988–90b 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total 42 43 45 46 41 44 43 45 43 37 36 27
Failed 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 1 4 2 10
a Although the sample period used in our analysis is during 1988–2000, the failed banks in 2001 were used to predict
the probability of failure.
b During 1988–90, there was no change in the number of commercial banks.
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables
1988–2000 1988–93 1994–2000
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Market reaction
GDEPR 0.5277 1.7639 0.3055 0.8545 0.6639 2.1285
IDEP 0.1986 0.1347 0.1961 0.1337 0.2006 0.1356
GCRER 0.4105 2.1681 0.2519 0.4813 0.5077 2.7252
Risk measures
CARATIO 0.0964 0.1417 0.1097 0.0755 0.0862 0.1758
BADLOAN 0.0763 0.2685 0.0484 0.0752 0.0976 0.3495
LIQDEP 1.1919 2.7347 1.5464 3.8800 0.9202 1.2385
SPREAD 0.1738 0.1988 0.1480 0.1705 0.1936 0.2162
PFAIL 0.0545 0.1379 0.0054 0.0064 0.0922 0.1741
Control variables
SHASSET 0.0250 0.0384 0.0267 0.0413 0.0238 0.0361
TOTAL ASSETSa 1540.84 2539.97 1109.95 1711.31 1871.05 2986.36
BADTK 0.1383 1.6030 0.2338 0.4868 0.0652 2.0861
SHCREA 0.3077 0.1461 0.3405 0.1440 0.2826 0.1429
EXPENSE 0.2185 0.2260 0.1244 0.0693 0.2906 0.2733
GCRE 3.38 40.43 1.14 1.35 5.09 53.70
FOREIGN 0.1420 0.3494 0.1659 0.3728 0.1237 0.3298
STATE 0.1362 0.3433 0.1659 0.3728 0.1134 0.3176
LISTING 0.2471 0.4317 0.2063 0.4055 0.2784 0.4490
BRANCH 1.6212 2.7381 1.6983 2.8677 1.5621 2.6379
AGE 40.75 34.15 41.45 33.73 40.22 34.51
Economic variables
CYCLE 0.0384 0.0470 0.0467 0.0351 0.0320 0.0536
CRISIS 0.2257 0.4184 0.1704 0.3768 0.2680 0.4437
REALINT 0.1301 0.1889 0.0693 0.1174 0.1767 0.2181
a In billion TL in terms of 1987 prices.
1422 WORLD DEVELOPMENTstatistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, as hypothe-
sized in the case in which banks undertook
moral hazard behavior with full deposit insur-
ance. We observed that the mean capital–asset
ratio (CARATIO) and liquid assets-to-deposits
ratio (LIQDEP) decreased in the second part of
the sample period, indicating an increase in
risk. Similarly, the ratio of non-performing
loans (BADLOAN), the predicted probability
of failure (PFAIL), and the interest rate margin
(SPREAD) increased signiﬁcantly during the
full insurance period of 1994–2000 (see TableA3 in the Appendix for pairwise correlations
of variables).
The mean values indicate that the share of
short-term credits (SHCREA) declined and
that the total assets in terms of 1987 prices (TO-
TAL ASSETS) and the expense ratio (EX-
PENSE) increased signiﬁcantly in the second
sub-period. The increase in the growth rates
of real deposits and credits explains the increase
in total assets. More banks were listed on the
ISE after 1994, although some of the listed
banks failed in the full insurance period. The
MARKET REACTION TO RISKY BANKS 1423number of foreign and state banks in Turkey
decreased in the second sub-period. The decline
in the number of state banks can be attributed
to privatization and mergers.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
(a) Predicting the probability of failure
The results of the logit model for the 1988–
2000 period are presented in Table 3. Although
all of the variables have expected signs, only
three variables, TREND, SHASSET, and LIQ-
DEP are found to be signiﬁcant. It seems that
the probability of failure for the banks in Tur-
key increased signiﬁcantly over time. In terms
of bank characteristics, larger and liquid banks
are considered to be less risky during the anal-
ysis period. Although only few variables are
found to be signiﬁcant, the logit model accu-
rately classiﬁes almost 90% of the observed re-
sponses (the concordant ratio = 87.8%).
(b) Market reaction
The empirical results of the market reaction
models with time-ﬁxed eﬀects as speciﬁed inTable 3. Logit estimates for the probability of bank
failure (PFAIL)
Estimated
coeﬃcient
Standard
error
INTERCEPT 4.4972** 2.0377
TREND 0.3486*** 0.1038
SHASSET 31.6706* 16.9861
CARATIO 1.9193 3.9053
BADTK 0.2238 0.3348
LIQDEP 2.0461* 1.2087
SHCREA 0.1093 2.4107
RETURN 4.4800 4.9404
EXPENSE 0.4490 1.1476
SPREAD 1.3547 1.2783
GCRE 0.0512 0.1277
GROWTH-IP 0.2954 4.8925
CRISIS 0.6804 0.5928
Log likelihood 61.8975
v2 63.5167***
Concordant ratio (%) 87.8
Discordant ratio (%) 11.5
Note: *,**, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The mean (median)
values of PFAIL are 3.32% (0.96%) and 29.91%
(16.41%) for non-failed and failed banks.Eqn. (1) are presented in Table 4. First, the
reaction of the Turkish depositors toward risk-
iness 13 was found to be consistent with the
market discipline hypothesis, controlling for
some bank characteristics and year eﬀects. It
is observed that as the riskiness increased, the
interest rate on deposits increased signiﬁcantly.
Although the bank’s growth rate on real depos-
its is found to decline, the coeﬃcient is not sig-
niﬁcant. More precisely, a 10% increase in the
predicted probability of failure of a bank is ex-
pected to result in a 4.85% decrease in the
growth rate of deposits; in order to attract
depositors, risky banks oﬀer a 1.69% higher
interest rate.
A similar reaction is observed in the credit
market. We found that banks’ expected proba-
bility of failure has a strong negative impact on
the growth rate of credit provisions. The
growth rate of credits declines by 1.55%, as
the predicted probability of failure increases
by 1%. The banking sector that has almost no
possibility of a bank run might provide con-
tractual ﬂexibility to convince borrowers to
borrow more; however, borrowers preferred
to keep their lending relationship with the
banks with lower failure risk. 14
In the last column of Table 4, we presented
the results of a model that controls for the
growth rate of deposits. If a bank has a low
growth rate of deposits, it may have to reduce
its lending; hence, the growth rate of credits
should depend on the growth rate of deposits.
As expected, the coeﬃcient on this variable is
found to be signiﬁcant and positive. However,
it did not aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃ-
cient on the PFAIL variable. Moreover, the
explanatory power of our model increased from
1.47% to 54.60%.
The results about the size of a bank suggest
that savers and borrowers do not seem to be-
lieve in ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ protection. As banks
grew, the deposit interest rate they oﬀered in-
creased signiﬁcantly. State banks are found to
oﬀer a 4.34% higher interest rate than non-state
banks during the analysis period. However, a
signiﬁcantly high pricing strategy on deposits
by banks owned by the government (STATE)
did not help them to improve their growth rate
on deposits signiﬁcantly. The banks listed in the
stock market oﬀered a 5.13% lower interest rate
than unlisted banks and held almost a 10% low-
er growth rate on deposits and an approxi-
mately 4–5% lower growth rate on credits.
Controlling for other bank characteristics and
year eﬀects, as the age of a bank increases, its
Table 4. Market reaction with time-ﬁxed eﬀects
Deposit market Credit market
GDEPR IDEP GCRER
PFAIL 0.4852 0.1694*** 1.5506*** 1.1079***
(0.3287) (0.0351) (0.4147) (0.1897)
SIZE 0.0044 0.0149*** 0.0692 0.0732
(0.0460) (0.0055) (0.0698) (0.0545)
LISTING 0.0946 0.0513*** 0.0368 0.0495
(0.1369) (0.0172) (0.1643) (0.1060)
BRANCH 0.0519* 0.0026 0.0772 0.0299
(0.0310) (0.0028) (0.0532) (0.0298)
AGE 0.0055** 0.0002 0.0003 0.0053**
(0.0023) (0.0003) (0.0033) (0.0025)
STATE 0.3491 0.0434* 0.6556 0.3372
(0.3532) (0.0256) (0.6846) (0.3550)
FOREIGN 0.5291 0.0702* 0.0078 0.4905*
(0.3795) (0.0379) (0.4311) (0.2727)
GDEPR 0.9123***
(0.2365)
Adj. R2 0.0297 0.0580 0.0084 0.5419
N 463 514 463 463
Notes: Newey–West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses.
*,**, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
1424 WORLD DEVELOPMENTdeposit growth rate is found to decline signiﬁ-
cantly, but its credit growth rate is found to in-
crease signiﬁcantly. This result suggests that
creditors prefer to work with the old banks
rather than making new connections with
young banks. In order to attract depositors,
foreign banks are found to oﬀer a 7% higher
interest rate than domestic banks.
Table 5 reports the results of the model,
examining the impacts of risk and full deposit
insurance on market reaction variables, con-
trolling for economic conditions instead of year
dummy variables. The results are similar to
those reported in Table 4. The signiﬁcant im-
pact of risk is also observed for all of the mar-
ket reaction variables: As the predicted
probability of a bank increases by 10%, the
growth rate of deposits decreases by 6.79%,
banks increase their interest rates by 12.41%,
and the growth rate in real credits declines by
16.7%. Moreover, the results indicate that the
growth rates of deposits and credits were signif-
icantly higher during this period than during
the partial and no insurance periods, and banks
paid an almost 1% higher deposit interest rate
during this sub-period. It is found that the
growth rate of credits (deposits) during the full
insurance period is 0.58% (0.38%) higher than
in the period without generous guarantee.During the 1988–2000 period, real output
growth (CYCLE) signiﬁcantly improved the
growth rate of real credit provisions by banks.
During expansionary episodes, although banks
reduced the real interest rates on deposits, the
growth rate on real deposits was not aﬀected
signiﬁcantly. In the periods of crisis (CRISIS),
we found that the real interest rate on deposits
(IDEP) declined 1.6%, controlling for economic
growth and some bank characteristics. Typi-
cally, macroeconomic shocks cause nominal
prices, including interest rates, to increase sig-
niﬁcantly. In Turkey, we observed that the
inﬂation rate grew faster than the nominal
interest rate on deposits and lowered the real
returns on deposits, IDEP. However, the eﬀect
of economic uncertainties during the crisis sub-
stantially increased risk premiums on nominal
loan rates. Especially, the declining net worth
of the companies, that is, the market value of
the collateral of the ﬁrms increases the risk pre-
mium on loan rates during the crisis periods.
Hence, these results conﬁrm our expectations
that during the crisis, the growth rate of real
credits, GCRER declined signiﬁcantly. When
government securities provide high and real re-
turn, growth in deposits increases, and the
growth rate on credits decreases. Because the
real interest rates on T-bills will be high when
Table 5. Market reaction controlling for economic conditions
Deposit market Credit market
GDEPR IDEP GCRER
INTERCEPT 0.5345** 0.2419*** 0.6692** 0.1816
(0.2480) (0.0351) (0.2824) (0.2394)
PFAIL 0.6793* 0.1241*** 1.6703*** 1.0506***
(0.3488) (0.0318) (0.4808) (0.1868)
DI 0.3829** 0.0071 0.5802*** 0.2309**
(0.1807) (0.0198) (0.2202) (0.1097)
SIZE 0.0031 0.0121* 0.0629 0.0657
(0.0482) (0.0069) (0.0620) (0.0537)
LISTING 0.0992 0.0304** 0.0482 0.0423
(0.1407) (0.0146) (0.1701) (0.1064)
BRANCH 0.0544 0.0076** 0.0798 0.0302
(0.0331) (0.0029) (0.0549) (0.0301)
AGE 0.0053** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0051**
(0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0030) (0.0024)
STATE 0.3503 0.0633*** 0.6466 0.3271
(0.3610) (0.0235) (0.6872) (0.3503)
FOREIGN 0.5288 0.0451 0.0148 0.4971*
(0.3751) (0.0382) (0.4240) (0.2638)
CYCLE 0.7908 0.2458*** 2.7606** 3.4819***
(1.1300) (0.0729) (1.0694) (0.7637)
CRISIS 0.1685 0.0160 0.3849*** 0.2312*
(0.1525) (0.0130) (0.1463) (0.1341)
REAL_INT 0.4754 0.0080 0.6102 1.0439***
(0.3906) (0.0311) (0.5453) (0.3709)
GDEPR 0.9122***
(0.2347)
Adj R2 0.0349 0.0986 0.0154 0.5460
N 463 514 463 463
Notes: Newey–West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
MARKET REACTION TO RISKY BANKS 1425there is high uncertainty in the economy, indi-
viduals prefer to invest in bank deposits, the
lowest-risk investment alternative. Moreover,
because of the increase in uncertainty, the cred-
it market reduces in size.
To study whether market reaction changed
signiﬁcantly with the introduction of full insur-
ance in 1994, the model with time-ﬁxed eﬀects
speciﬁed in Eqn. (1) was re-estimated for two
sub-periods: 1988–93 and 1994–2000. The re-
sults are reported in Table 6. It was found that
depositors reacted negatively to bank risk-tak-
ing after the introduction of a generous guaran-
tee. Although no signiﬁcant reaction to risk by
the depositors was found in the ﬁrst sub-period,
they seemed to avoid the risky banks during the
full insurance period. This result suggests that
depositors did not trust the government guar-
antee. As emphasized by Cull, Senbet, andSorge (2002), institutional development and
government integrity are important for the
credibility of the explicit deposit insurance
scheme. It seems that the existence of a gener-
ous guarantee opened the eyes of depositors,
and they punished risky banks either by with-
drawing their deposits or by requesting higher
interest rates on deposits. Although the coeﬃ-
cient on risk in the GDEPR model is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant, it is found that a 10%
increase in bank risk is found to result in a
4.06% decrease in the growth rate on deposits.
Moreover, the impact of risk on deposit interest
rate is signiﬁcant. For example, if PFAIL in-
creases by 10%, the deposit interest rate will in-
crease by 1.57%.
From the borrowers’ side, a negative impact
of risk on the growth rate of real credits was
observed in both sub-periods, but it became
Table 6. Market reaction with time-ﬁxed eﬀects before and during full deposit insurance period
Deposit market Credit market
GDEPR IDEP GCRER
1988–93 1994–2000 1988–93 1994–2000 1988–93 1994–2000
PFAIL 21.3909 0.4062 2.0009 0.1572*** 1.7921 1.6585***
(16.0472) (0.3952) (2.5016) (0.0329) (7.0890) (0.5568)
SIZE 0.1014 0.0137 0.0254*** 0.0085 0.0270 0.0972
(0.1149) (0.0746) (0.0050) (0.0100) (0.0503) (0.0928)
LISTING 0.1275 0.1564 0.0605 ** 0.0288 0.0083 0.0047
(0.2466) (0.1507) (0.0297) (0.0193) (0.1086) (0.2439)
BRANCH 0.0457 0.0718 0.0005 0.0081* 0.0307 0.1629
(0.0464) (0.0732) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0201) (0.1224)
AGE 0.0065* 0.0063* 0.0000 0.0004 0.0016 0.0010
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0054)
STATE 0.0203 0.7559 0.0191 0.0773 0.2335 1.6367
(0.1735) (0.7159) (0.0225) (0.0498) (0.1416) (1.2783)
FOREIGN 0.2539 1.2355** 0.1060 ** 0.0315 0.3405*** 0.2477
(0.2324) (0.5554) (0.0491) (0.0569) (0.1045) (0.7646)
Adj. R2 0.0927 0.0461 0.0061 0.1323 0.1237 0.0157
N 176 287 223 291 176 287
Notes:Newey–West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
1426 WORLD DEVELOPMENTsigniﬁcant during the generous guarantee peri-
od. These results suggest that borrowers care-
fully chose their banks from the beginning
and build a lending relationship with their
incumbent banks. It can be argued that bor-
rowers would anticipate the possibility of in-
creased agency costs during the generous
guarantee period and act more cautiously in
the full insurance period, because increasing
the moral hazard by banks would have a signif-
icant impact on borrowers. For example, the
failure of the credit relationship with a primary
bank would cause either more costly funding of
the investments or complete termination.
Hence, as expected, creditors act more disci-
plinary in the second sub-period. Even though
the possibility of a bank run was theoretically
eliminated, in practice, the political turmoil
after 1994 signiﬁcantly undermined the credi-
bility of the incumbent government and the
generous guarantee system. 15
Although interest rates oﬀered by state banks
were 7.73% higher than those oﬀered by private
banks in the second sub-period, high pricing
strategies by state banks failed to achieve signif-
icant growth in deposit collections after 1994.
In Turkey, the reactions of the depositors and
borrowers against state banks may be explained
by the fact that loanable funds collected by
state banks were mostly used to lend—as their‘‘duty’’—to a favored sector at a price below
the market interest rates. In 1999, the losses
of the state banks reached 30% of their total as-
sets. Our ﬁndings suggest that, over time, the
worsening health of the surviving state banks
might be more evident, so that, although these
banks oﬀered higher deposit rates, they could
not achieve higher deposit growth. Moreover,
although foreign banks oﬀered higher interest
rates than private banks in each sub-period,
their growth rates on deposits and credits were
lower in the ﬁrst sub-period but higher in the
second sub-period. These ﬁndings suggest that
foreign banks increased their involvement in
both credit and deposit markets.
(c) Was it market punishment or the
eﬀect of crisis?
It can be argued that our empirical ﬁndings
about deposit and credit markets can be ex-
plained by the three ﬁnancial crises in Turkey
during our sample period 16 rather than by
the signiﬁcant reaction of borrowers and depos-
itors toward risk. For example, Calomiris and
Powell (2001) found similar reactions of depos-
itors in Argentina during a ﬁnancial crisis. To
explore this possibility, we performed robust-
ness checks and summarized the results in Ta-
ble 7. 17 In the analysis, two diﬀerent models
MARKET REACTION TO RISKY BANKS 1427were estimated. The ﬁrst one (Model I) is the
same model reported in Table 5. The second
model (Model II) includes an interaction vari-
able between DI and PFAIL to examine
whether or not the impact of a bank’s expected
probability of solvency on market reaction
variables changed with the introduction of the
generous guarantee in 1994.
In the ﬁrst robustness check (Panel A in Ta-
ble 7), the models were estimated by excluding
the crisis years from the sample. The results
are similar for the whole sample and for the
sub-period with the generous government guar-
antee. Although there was no change in the sign
of the risk coeﬃcient (PFAIL), the impact of
risk was found to be signiﬁcant for the whole
period (Model I) for all of the measures of mar-
ket reaction. As banks undertook more risk in
the second period, they faced a signiﬁcant de-Table 7. Robustness tests: is it mark
GDEPR
Model I Model II Mo
Panel A: Without 1991, 1994, and 2000
PFAIL 0.7660* 15.8269 0.20
(0.3983) (18.2441) (0.
PFAIL*DI 16.5975
(18.2684)
PFAIL(1994–2000) 0.7706*
(3.70)
Adj R2 0.0297 0.0279 0.
N 351 351 3
Panel B: Two-step estimation
PFAIL 0.5282* 13.5496 0.14
(0.3012) (12.0073) (0.
PFAIL*DI 14.0053
(11.8216)
PFAIL(1994–2000) 0.4557
(1.92)
Adj, R2 0.0002 0.0007 0.
N 463 463 5
Notes: The model that controls for economic conditions (G
dummy variable) in addition to bank characteristics is estim
on the risk variable with their Newey–West heteroscedas
parentheses. Then, another model is estimated by including a
variable, DI, and risk measure, PFAIL. The second row
interaction variable in the second model with their standa
2000) shows the estimated coeﬃcient for the generous insur
with the results of a Wald test. *, **, and *** denote statistica
Panel A shows the estimates when the crisis years 1991, 199
the results of the two-step estimation. In the ﬁrst step, the m
variables except PFAIL. In the second stage, the residuals o
interaction variables.cline in their deposit growth rate, while they
signiﬁcantly increased their interest rate on
deposits. Moreover, there was a signiﬁcant de-
cline in the growth rate on real credits in the
second sub-period. These results indicate that
the impact of risk on market reaction variables
cannot be attributed only to crises and that ris-
ky banks are being punished by depositors and
borrowers. Our ﬁndings imply that both depos-
itors and borrowers did not trust the govern-
ment guarantee and reacted signiﬁcantly when
there was full deposit insurance.
In the second robustness check, the two-step
estimation is applied (Panel B in Table 7). In
the ﬁrst step, all of the independent variables
except PFAIL were regressed against the mea-
sures of market reaction. Then, in the second
step, residuals obtained from the ﬁrst stage
were regressed against PFAIL and against theet reaction of the eﬀect of crisis?
IDEP GCRER
del I Model II Model I Model II
16*** 0.5290 2.2618*** 5.7335
0564) (2.7226) (0.5299) (16.1945)
0.3276 3.4727
(2.7406) (16.2231)
0.2013 *** 2.2608***
(12.36) (18.14)
1154 0.1131 0.0099 0.0070
98 398 351 351
46 *** 3.2086** 1.2986 *** 1.4680
0286) (1.3343) (0.3603) (12.3648)
3.0483** 0.1685
(1.3199) (12.1237)
0.1603*** 1.2995 ***
(30.77) (10.83)
0402 0.0624 0.0055 0.0034
14 514 463 463
DP growth rate, real interest rate on T-bills and crisis
ated ﬁrst. PFAIL rows represent the estimated coeﬃcient
ticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in
n interaction variable between deposit insurance dummy
PFAIL*DI presents the estimated coeﬃcients on the
rd errors in parentheses. The third row, PFAIL(1994–
ance period, and v2 statistics are reported in parentheses
l signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
4, and 2000 are excluded from the sample. Panel B shows
arket reaction measures are regressed against all of the
btained from the ﬁrst stage are regressed against risk and
1428 WORLD DEVELOPMENTinteraction variable between PFAIL and the DI
dummy variable. The results are similar: mar-
ket reaction was strengthened during the full
insurance period.
All of these ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial cri-
ses in Turkey were not the only reasons for the
impact of risk on market reaction measures.
The market seems to react signiﬁcantly in order
to punish those banks that are perceived to be
risky.
(d) Moral hazard
Table 8 summarizes the results of the model
for the moral hazard behavior of banks during
the whole sample period, 1988–2000. As ex-
pected, there are signiﬁcant indications that
generous deposit insurance created moral haz-
ard: the capital-to-assets ratio decreased by
1.63%, the proportion of non-performing loans
increased by 11.80%, and the ratio of liquid as-
sets to deposits decreased by 43.29%. Further-
more, after 1994, the spread widens, even
though it is not found to be statistically signif-
icant. These ﬁndings can be interpreted to meanTable 8. Moral h
CARATIO BADL
INTERCEPT 0.1637*** 0.05
(0.0076) (0.0
DI 0.0163** 0.11
(0.0081) (0.0
SHASSET 0.3363** 0.4
(0.1453) (0.3
LISTING 0.0361*** 0.0
(0.0073) (0.0
AGE 0.0005*** 0.0
(0.0001) (0.0
STATE 0.0344* 0.0
(0.0182) (0.0
FOREIGN 0.0328*** 0.0
(0.0065) (0.0
CYCLE 0.0014 0.4
(0.0757) (0.5
CRISIS 0.0203* 0.1
(0.0122) (0.0
REALINT 0.0413*** 0.2
(0.0149) (0.1
Adj R2 0.1247 0.0
N 527 54
Notes:Newey–West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
**, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%,
variables in the estimation of the model of probability
estimation of PFAIL.that banks undertook signiﬁcant risks during
the generous deposit insurance period in Tur-
key.
Large banks behaved more conservatively
during the full deposit insurance period. They
increased their liquidity and reduced non-per-
forming loans and their spread. All of the
banks show results that are statistically signiﬁ-
cant, controlling for bank characteristics and
economic conditions. However, believing in
the ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ argument, large banks
seem to have decreased their capital adequacy.
By coupling the narrow spread with the previ-
ous ﬁnding of declining deposit rates (see Table
4), we can conclude that large banks were able
to provide loans to borrowers with less default
risk, from 1988 to 2000.
Banks whose stocks are traded on the ISE are
found to have signiﬁcantly fewer non-perform-
ing loans than non-listed banks. This fact can
be explained both by the regulations imposed
by the Capital Markets Board and by the coer-
cion of current and potential investors in the
ISE. The coeﬃcients on the AGE variable sug-
gest that banks with a long history held lessazard estimates
OAN LIQDEP SPREAD
28* 1.4039*** 0.1961***
271) (0.1967) (0.0242)
80** 0.4329** 0.0110
486) (0.1853) (0.0200)
901 1.3100 0.0493
907) (0.9534) (0.2801)
959** 0.0860 0.0085
485) (0.0692) (0.0105)
003 0.0097*** 0.0002
005) (0.0022) (0.0002)
465 0.1876** 0.1273***
306) (0.0777) (0.0203)
147 2.1965*** 0.0953***
637) (0.7187) (0.0327)
790 2.4209 0.5086***
231) (1.9659) (0.1563)
043 0.1231 0.0615**
666) (0.1725) (0.0246)
525* 0.2105 0.1339***
347) (0.4828) (0.0439)
110 0.1199 0.1174
2 542 532
consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,
and 1% levels respectively. We excluded the economic
of failure, as these variables were already used in the
MARKET REACTION TO RISKY BANKS 1429capital and kept fewer liquid assets relative to
their deposits. Both state and foreign banks
had a signiﬁcantly narrower spread. Moreover,
during the same period, foreign banks had
more liquid assets, but state banks had less.
As expected, spread increased signiﬁcantly in
the crisis period. 18 The widening of the interest
margins indicates a greater exposure of banks
to credit risk, thus increasing their probability
of failure.5. CONCLUSION
This study examines the ways in which two
major stakeholders of banks reacted to the
risk-taking behavior of banks in Turkey. The
results show that both depositors and borrow-
ers reacted signiﬁcantly and tried to punish
risky banks. Moreover, the introduction of
complete guarantee was found to signiﬁcantly
strengthen the market reaction in Turkey.
Hence, depositors and borrowers showed their
reaction either by decreasing their involvement
with risky banks or by asking for a higher price
on their savings at risk. Nonetheless, bank
managers continued to undertake risky behav-
ior, especially in the period with full govern-
ment guarantee on deposits, implying that
generous coverage undermines market conﬁ-
dence. The ﬁndings of this paper and the results
of the recent massive banking crisis in 2001 sug-
gest that market reaction in Turkey was ineﬀec-
tive to reduce the moral hazard in the banking
sector. Our results support the ﬁndings of Opi-
ela (2004) that encouraging market monitoring
is ineﬀective in eliminating banks’ risk-taking.
Moreover, although the IMF and the World
Bank recommend that developing countries
adopt explicit deposit insurance (Demirguc-
Kunt, Kane & Laeven, 2007), it does not elim-
inate a banking crisis: even a market reacts to
the moral hazard behavior of banks.
Several factors might explain why the market
was not successful in disciplining banks in Tur-
key. First, the deposit insurance system is ill-de-
signed. The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund
paid for all the obligations of three failed,
mid-sized private banks in 1994, although the
coverage was partial. Since then, the system in
Turkey has been considered to be an implicit
blanket guarantee. The perception that the sys-
tem is completely insured encouraged bank
managers to engage in excessively risky activi-
ties. Eichengreen (2001) pointed out this issue
by saying that ‘‘a number of mid-sized banks[that] had taken highly-leveraged positions in
anticipation of continued declines in interest
rates. Banks ignored the standard rules for risk
management.’’
A second factor is the lack of eﬀective super-
vision in Turkey, which makes the system dys-
functional. Chhibber (2004) has a striking
statement on how the system in Turkey is not
working: ‘‘The Treasury (on site supervision)
and Central Bank (oﬀ-site supervision) both re-
ported to the Economy Minister (a politician)
and shared the supervision of a corrupted
banking system riddled with cronyism.’’ Fur-
thermore, the governance mechanism in the
Turkish banking system extensively permitted
related lending. Because these credits are not
monitored eﬀectively, most of them also be-
come non-performing loans.
The third explanation for observing ineﬀec-
tive market discipline in Turkey during the
sample period may be related to the misguid-
ance of external institutions (e.g., the IMF
and the World Bank) and of internal politics
in customizing the rules and regulations for
the Turkish banking sector. Several studies,
such as that of Alper and Onis (2002) empha-
size the role of external institutions in promot-
ing banking sector reforms, including the
rehabilitation of the deposit insurance system
in Turkey. The mismanagement of the priori-
ties of macroeconomic adjustment programs,
such as the one designed by the IMF in 1999
prevented the market from being disciplinary
toward banks. Akyuz and Boratav (2003) state
that ‘‘A better diagnosis of the conditions in
the Turkish banking system together with a
proper understanding of the dynamics of the
exchange rate-based stabilization programs
could have alerted policymakers to the risks
entailed by a rapid decline in interest rates as
well as to the vulnerability of the economy
to boom-bust cycles in capital ﬂows. . . In Tur-
key, overhauling the banking system before
launching the stabilization program would
have helped to avoid many of the subsequent
diﬃculties. . .’’ Moreover, the long duration
of explicit deposit insurance permitted some
insolvent banks to continue to operate and
to allocate credits in the pursuit of favored
economic and non-economic objectives of the
government. Although the market reacted
strongly to banks with a higher probability
of failure, the lax regulatory environment pre-
vented eﬀective forbearance.
In a banking system, many stakeholders are
expected to monitor and to take action for
1430 WORLD DEVELOPMENTeﬀective market discipline (Llewellyn & Mayes,
2003). In this paper, we studied the behavior of
only a few of them. However, as in most emerg-
ing economies, the involvement of several
stakeholders, such as supervisory agencies, rat-
ing agencies, and boards of directors, cannot be
examined due to the scarcity of reliable infor-
mation. When these data become available, fur-
ther investigation of the reaction of other
participants would strengthen ﬁndings on theeﬀectiveness of market reaction under gener-
ously protected systems. Moreover, the investi-
gation of the political economy framework of
the deposit insurance system would contribute
considerably to the paper. In this way, we can
identify the roles of domestic and/or external
institutions on the prevention of market disci-
pline. However, due to lack of micro level data
for the Turkish banks, the identiﬁcation of the
political inﬂuences was not possible.NOTES1. Llewellyn and Mayes (2003) identiﬁed ten stake-
holders that are expected to monitor banks: depositors,
managers, borrowers, supervisory agencies, rating agen-
cies, market traders, shareholders, boards of directors,
debt-holders, and employees.
2. According to the World Bank, Turkey is among the
upper-middle-income countries. In 2000, the average
bank-deposits-to-GDP ratio was 14.47%, 36.01%, and
84.90% in the low-income, lower-middle income, and
high-income countries respectively. Private credit pro-
vided by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions was, on average, 13.6%, 31.1%, and 95.5%
of the GDP in the low-income, lower-middle-income,
and high-income countries, respectively. These ﬁgures
are calculated using the data provided by Levine
www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publica-
tions.htm.
3. See Denizer (1997) for the imperfections in compe-
tition in the Turkish banking system.
4. The average annual inﬂation and the appreciation of
the US Dollar against the TL were 69.1% and 72.6%
respectively, in the period during 1988–94.
5. Source: http://www.bddk.org.tr/turkce/yayinlarve-
raporlar/sunumlar/22.
6. Because of the unavailability of interest rates on
deposits, an implicit interest rate, IDEP, is calculated by
dividing the total interest paid on deposits by the total
bank deposits.
7. These years are deﬁned as crisis years in Turkey by
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). These crises are
considered to be mini-crises, as their impact persisted for
only a short period (Chhibber, 2004).
8. In our analysis, we use a generated regressor
(PFAIL). Including PFAIL as an explanatory variablein regression can cause reported standard errors to be
incorrect. However, Pagan (1984) shows that standard
errors are consistent if the generated regressor is
obtained from a least-squares regression. DeYoung,
Flannery, Lang, and Sorescu (2001) report that the same
logic is applied when the logit model is used in the
estimation. Therefore, we did not implement any
correction here.
9. There are three diﬀerent types of banks operating in
Turkey: state-owned, private, and foreign banks. State
banks support a variety of government-subsidized lend-
ing programs, such as credits to agriculture, small- and
medium-sized enterprises, and public foundations in
Turkey. The largest bank, Ziraat Bank, is state owned.
In 2000, 34.3% of the assets of the banking system was
controlled by state-owned banks, whereas 49.5% was
owned by private banks.
10. Because of multicollinearity between the other
control variables and the absolute measure of size
(logarithm of total assets), we used the share of the
bank’s assets in the total assets of the banking sector,
SHASSET, to control for the size of the bank.11. To check if the results are robust to potential
endogeneity, we use generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimates, combining variables in levels and ﬁrst
diﬀerences. The results from the alternative estimates are
similar to the ones reported in the paper.
12. Although Imar Bank, a private bank did not fail
during our sample period, it is excluded from the sample
because of a recent disclosure about the possible
manipulation of its accounts.
13. We also estimated our models with diﬀerent mea-
sures of bank risk, instead of PFAIL, in order to test
whether our results depend on the measure of risk as in
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004). We examine cap-
ital adequacy (capital-to-asset ratio), liquidity risk (liquid
MARKET REACTION TO RISKY BANKS 1431assets-to-total assets ratio), and delinquency risk (non-
performing loans-to-total loans ratio). It is found that as
the capital adequacy of the bank (capital-to-asset ratio)
increases, the interest rate on deposits declines, and the
growth rate in credits increases. When delinquency risk
(non-performing loans-to-total loans ratio) increases, the
growth rate in credits declines signiﬁcantly. When bank
liquidity (liquid assets-to-total assets ratio) increases, the
growth rate in deposits and credits increases signiﬁcantly,
and the interest rate on deposits decline. All of these
ﬁndings support our ﬁndings about market discipline.
Among these measures of bank risk, the predicted
probability of failure has the highest correlation with
the actual probability of failure. The correlation coeﬃ-
cient between actual failure and PFAIL is 0.53; the
correlation coeﬃcient between actual failure and the
capital adequacy ratio is0.18; the correlation coeﬃcient
between actual failure and delinquency risk is 0.05; and
the correlation coeﬃcient between actual failure and
liquidity risk is 0.05. Therefore, we reported only the
results with this measure of risk. The other results are
available from the authors upon request.
14. The inferences from this model (GCRER) about
market discipline should be made cautiously, because of
low R2. This low value can be explained by the distortion
of the credit market by the government: the single most
important borrower of commercial banks.
15. During the second sub-period 1994–2000, eight
incumbent coalition governments were formed in Tur-
key.
16. It can be argued that the dummy variable CRISIS
is not an appropriate proxy to measure the eﬀect of a
crisis. The Turkish Lira (TL) was devalued tremen-
dously in the crisis years. The average annual devalua-
tion rate of the TL against the US dollar was 39.28%
over the sample period 1988–2000. It was 42.32%,
62.37%, 53.34%, and 11.93% in 1991, 1994, 1999, and
2000 respectively. Therefore, the devaluation rate(DEVAL) was included in the model instead of a
dummy variable CRISIS, and estimations were ob-
tained. It was found that as the riskiness of a bank
increased, all of the market reaction measures were
signiﬁcantly aﬀected: the growth rates in real deposits
and real credits declined, and the real interest rate on
deposits increased, controlling for other bank charac-
teristics and the real growth rate. Moreover, similar
impacts of risk on growth and deposit rates were
observed during the generous guarantee period. We also
estimated the models by interacting all variables with
CRISIS. Most of the interacted variables are found to be
insigniﬁcant. Unexpectedly, during the crisis period, as
the riskiness of banks increased, their growth rate on
real credits increased signiﬁcantly, but the overall impact
of risk was still negative. Such loan growth during
ﬁnancial breakdowns might be explained by the
increased demand for loans when the cash ﬂows of
private and public companies dried up during the crisis
periods. Borrowers might be able to acquire bank
ﬁnancing through their political connections with certain
state banks or their aﬃliation with related banks in
Turkey.
17. Only the coeﬃcients on the risk measure PFAIL,
on an interaction variable between PFAIL and a full
deposit insurance dummy variable (DI), and on the
calculated coeﬃcient on PFAIL for the full insurance
period are reported in Table 7, in order to save space.
The complete estimates are available from the authors
upon request.
18. As previously mentioned, banks may act diﬀerently
during crises. Therefore, we estimated the models by
interacting all variables with CRISIS. Most of the
coeﬃcients on these interaction variables were found to
be insigniﬁcant. However, it was found that in the crisis
period, as size increased, banks held signiﬁcantly less
liquid assets. Moreover, when there was deposit insur-
ance, banks increased their spread and their holding of
non-performing loans during the crises.REFERENCESAkyuz, Y. (1990). Financial system and policies in
Turkey in the 1980s. In T. Aricanli, & D. Rodnik
(Eds.), The political economy of Turkey. London:
Macmillan.
Akyuz, Y., & Boratav, K. (2003). The making of the
Turkish ﬁnancial crisis. World Development, 31(9),
1549–1566.
Alper, C. E. & Onis, Z. (2002). Soft budget constraints,
government ownership of banks and regulatory
failure: The political economy of the Turkish bank-
ing system in the post-capital account liberalization
era. Bogazici University Economics Working Paper
ISS/EC 02-02.Angbazo, L. (1997). Commercial bank net interest
margins, default risk, interest rate risk and oﬀ-
balance sheet banking. Journal of Banking and
Finance, (1), 55–58.
Avery, R. B., Belton, T. M., & Goldberg, M. A. (1988).
Market discipline regulating bank risk: Evidence
from the capital markets. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 20(4), 597–610.
Baer, H., & Brewer, E. (1986). Uninsured deposits as a
source of market discipline: Some new evidence.
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspec-
tives, 20(September/October), 23–31.
1432 WORLD DEVELOPMENTBarajas, A. & Steiner, R. (2000). Depositor behavior and
market discipline in Colombia. International Mone-
tary Fund, Working Paper No. 214.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., Jr., & Levine, R. (2004). Bank
regulation and supervision: What works best? Jour-
nal of Financial Intermediation, 13(2), 205–248.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001). The
new basel capital accord, consultative document,
January.
Calomiris, C. W., & Powell, A. (2001). Can emerging
market bank regulators establish credible discipline?
The case of Argentine, 1992–1999. In F. S. Mishkin
(Ed.), Prudential supervision: What works and what
doesn’t. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cargill, T. F. (1989). CAMEL ratings and the CD
market. Journal of Financial Services Research, 3(4),
347–358.
Chhibber, A. (2004). The economic policy reform of
Turkey. <http://scid.stanford.edu/events/AChhib-
er%20Paper.pdf>.
Cizre, U., & Yeldan, E. (2005). The Turkish encounter
with neo-liberalism: Economics and politics in the
2000/2001 crises. Review of International Political
Economy, 12(3), 387–408.
Cull, R., Senbet, L. W., & Sorge, M. (2002). The eﬀect of
deposit insurance on ﬁnancial depth: a cross-country
analysis. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
42(4), 673–694.
Demir, F. (2004). A failure story: Politics and ﬁnancial
liberalization in turkey, revisiting the revolving
door hypothesis. World Development, 32(5), 851–
869.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2002). Does
deposit insurance increase banking system stability?
An empirical investigation. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 49(7), 1373–1406.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (2004). Market
discipline and deposit insurance. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 51(2), 375–399.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Kane, E. J. & Laeven, L. (2007).
Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and
design. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 12862.
Denizer, C. (1997). The eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization
and new bank entry on market structure and
competition in Turkey. The World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1839.
Denizer, C. A, Gultekin, M. A. & Gultekin N. B. (2000).
Distorted incentives and ﬁnancial development in
Turkey. World Bank Financial Structure and Eco-
nomic Development Conference Papers.
DeYoung, R., Flannery, M. J., Lang, W. W., & Sorescu,
S. M. (2001). The information content of bank exam
ratings and subordinated debt prices. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 33(4), 900–925.
Eichengreen, B. 2001. Crisis prevention and manage-
ment: Any new lessons from argentina and Turkey?
Background paper for the World Bank’s Global
Development Finance 2002. <http://info.worldbank.
org/etools/docs/library/154927/ﬁnanceforum2002/
pdf/eichengreen_argentina.pdf>.
Ellis, D., & Flannery, M. J. (1992). Does the debt
market assess large banks’ risk? Journal of Monetary
Economics, 30(3), 481–502.Ersel, H. (1999). Managing ﬁnancial liberalization in
Turkey: Consistent banking regulation mimeo-
graphed, Yapi Kredi Bank, Istanbul, Turkey.
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/mdf/mdf3/papers/
ﬁnance/Ersel.pdf>.
Flannery, M. J., & Sorescu, S. M. (1996). Evidence of
bank market discipline in subordinated debenture
yields: 1983–1991. The Journal of Finance, 51(4),
1347–1377.
Gorton, G., & Santomero, A. (1990). Market discipline
and bank subordinated debt. Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, 22(1), 119–128.
Hannan, T. H., & Hanweck, G. A. (1988). Bank
insolvency risk and the market for large certiﬁcates
of deposit. Journal of Money Credit and Banking,
20(2), 203–211.
Kim, M., Kliger, D., & Vale, B. (2003). Estimating
switching costs: The case of banking. Journal of
Financial Intermediation, 12(1), 25–56.
Kim, M., Kristiansen, E. G., & Vale, B. (2005).
Endogenous product diﬀerentiation in credit mar-
kets: What do borrowers pay for? Journal of Banking
and Finance, 29(3), 681–699.
Llewellyn, D. T. & Mayes, D. G. (2003). The role of
market discipline in handling problem banks. Bank
of Finland Discussion Paper No. 21.
Martinez-Peria, M. S., & Schmukler, S. L. (2001). Do
depositors punish banks for bad behavior? Market
discipline, deposit insurance and banking crises. The
Journal of Finance, 56(3), 497–514.
Opiela, T. (2004). Was there an implicit full guarantee at
ﬁnancial institutions in Thailand? Evidence of risk
pricing by depositors. Journal of Comparative Eco-
nomics, 32(3), 519–541.
Pagan, A. (1984). Econometric issues in the analysis of
regressions with generated regressors. International
Economic Review, 25(1), 221–247.
Park, S. (1995). Market discipline by depositors evidence
from reduced form equations. Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance, 35, 497–514.
Park, S., & Peristiani, S. (1998). Market discipline by
thrift depositors. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 30(3), 347–364.
Pazarbasioglu, C. (2002). Turk Bankacilik Sektorundeki
Son Gelismeler: BDDK’nin Rolu. <http://www.
bddk.org.tr/turkce/yayinlarveraporlar/yayinlarvera-
porlar.htm#6>.
Rojas-Suarez, L. (2001). Rating banks in emerging
markets: What credit rating agencies should learn
from ﬁnancial indicators. Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Working Paper Series,
No. WP01-6.
Sironi, A. (2003). Testing for market discipline in the
european banking industry: Evidence from subordi-
nated debt issues. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 35(3), 443–472.
Soral, H. B., Iscan, T. B., & Hebb, G. (2006). Fraud,
banking crisis, and regulatory enforcement: Evidence
from micro-level transactions data. European Journal
of Law and Economics, 21(2), 179–197.
Wong, K. P. (1997). On the determinants of bank
interest margins under credit and interest rate risks.
Journal of Banking and Finance, 21(2), 251–271.
APPENDIX
Table A1. Deﬁnition of variables used in the estimations
Variables Deﬁnition of variables
Market reaction
GDEPR Percentage change in the real total deposits of a bank
IDEP Imputed interest rate on deposits, calculated by dividing total interest paid on deposits
by total deposits of a bank
GCRER Percentage change in the real total credits of a bank
Risk measures
CARATIO Total capital to total assets ratio
BADLOAN Non-performing loans to total credits ratio
LIQDEP Total liquid assets to total deposits
SPREAD The diﬀerence between imputed interest rates on deposits and credits
PFAIL The predicted probability of failure of a bank using the model speciﬁed in Table 3
Control variables
DI A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the full deposit insurance period, 1994–2000; 0
otherwise
SHASSET Total assets of a bank divided by total assets of banking sector in that year
SIZE Natural Logarithm of total assets of a bank expressed in terms of 1987 prices
BADTK Non-performing loans to total credits ratio
SHCREA Short-term credits to total assets ratio
EXPENSE Total expenses to total assets ratio
GCRE The credit growth rate of a bank divided by the mean credit growth rate in the banking
sector in that year
FOREIGN Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for foreign banks; 0 for others
STATE Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for state banks; 0 for others
LISTING Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for banks whose stocks are traded in the Istanbul
Stock Exchange; 0 for others
BRANCH Number of branches/100
AGE Age of a bank
Economic variables
CYCLE Growth rate in real GDP
CRISIS A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the crisis years 1991, 1994 and 2000 as deﬁned
by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), and 0 otherwise
REALINT Real interest rate on Turkish T-bills
Note: In the calculation of the real monetary values, all of the monetary values are expressed in terms of 1987 prices.
(See Overleaf)
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Table A2. The list of banks included in the sample
Name of bank Period Name of bank Period
Adabank 1988–2000 Kocbank 1988–2000
Akbank 1988–2000 Korfez Bankasi 1989–2000
Alternatif Bank 1993–2000 Marmara Bankasi 1991–93
Anadolu Bankasi 1998–2000 Milli Aydin Bankasi 1988–2000
ArapTurk Bankasi 1988–2000 MNG Bank 1992–2000
Bank Ekspress 1993–98 Ogretmenler Bankasi 1988–90
Bank Kapital 1992–99 Osmanli Bankasi 1988–2000
Bayindir Bank 1993–2000 Oyakbank 1991–2000
Bnp Ak 1990–2000 Pamukbank 1988–2000
Demirbank 1988–2000 Sekerbank 1988–2000
Denizbank 1998–2000 Sitebank 1991–2000
Denizcilik Bankasi 1988–91 Sumerbank 1988–99
Dis Ticaret Bankasi 1988–2000 TEB 1988–2000
Egebank 1988–99 Tekstilbank 1988–2000
EGS Bank 1997–2000 TIIB 1988–93
Emlak Bankasi 1988–2000 Toprakbank 1993–2000
Eskisehir Bankasi 1988–99 Turkish Bank 1992–2000
Etibank 1988–2000 Turk Ticaret Bankasi 1988–97
Fibabank 1989–2000 Tutunbank 1988–98
Finansbank 1988–2000 TYT Bank 1989–93
Garanti Bankasi 1988–2000 Ulusal Bank 1990–2000
Halk Bankasi 1988–2000 Vakiﬂar Bankasi 1988–2000
Interbank 1989–97 Yapi Kredi Bankasi 1988–2000
Iktisat Bankasi 1988–2000 Yurtbank 1994–98
Is Bankasi 1988–2000 Ziraat Bankasi 1988–2000
Kentbank 1993–2000
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Table A3. Correlation coeﬃcients
SIZE SHASSET CARATIO BADLOAN LIQDEP SPREAD PFAIL DI LISTING BRANCH AGE STATE FOREIGN
SHASSET 0.741
CARATIO 0.272 0.117
BADLOAN 0.047 0.067 0.305
LIQDEP 0.188 0.127 0.080 0.034
SPREAD 0.121 0.129 0.008 0.198 0.198
PFAIL 0.010 0.159 0.592 0.548 0.099 0.211
DI 0.149 0.045 0.081 0.105 0.116 0.122 0.316
LISTING 0.341 0.152 0.029 0.073 0.082 0.058 0.038 0.081
BRANCH 0.696 0.937 0.117 0.037 0.133 0.080 0.109 0.026 0.146
AGE 0.526 0.512 0.201 0.052 0.165 0.088 0.030 0.008 0.003 0.506
STATE 0.408 0.556 0.103 0.041 0.093 0.218 0.072 0.081 0.225 0.536 0.306
FOREIGN 0.355 0.219 0.050 0.010 0.337 0.125 0.117 0.066 0.230 0.217 0.108 0.158
CYCLE 0.011 0.015 0.023 0.003 0.069 0.170 0.016 0.152 0.033 0.017 0.006 0.019 0.038
CRISIS 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.110 0.045 0.156 0.250 0.128 0.051 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.000
REALINT 0.078 0.023 0.067 0.093 0.008 0.110 0.208 0.262 0.043 0.047 0.025 0.058 0.068
Notes: Correlation coeﬃcient between CYCLE and CRISIS is 0.328; the correlation coeﬃcient between CYCLE and REALINT is 0.005; the correlation coeﬃcient
between CRISIS and REALINT is 0.108.
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